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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 07-2351
____________
TAMMY M. PALMER,
Appellant
v.
*MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

*(Pursuant to Rule 43(c), F.R.A.P.)
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 06-cv-01385)
District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 15, 2008
Before: AMBRO, FISHER and MICHEL,* Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 8, 2008)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________

*

The Honorable Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.

FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Tammy Palmer asserts that the Commissioner of Social Security erred in awarding
her social security disability insurance benefits for a closed period, rather than on an
ongoing basis. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Commissioner, affirming the Commissioner’s final decision to award benefits for a closed
period. We will affirm the District Court.
I.
Palmer was born in January 1965. She has a high-school education, and in her
previous job she worked on a production line, assembling medical products under a
microscope. Palmer contends she began suffering from stiffness and soreness in
November 1992. In October 1995, Palmer’s blood work showed elevated rheumatoid
factors, thus favoring a diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis. Palmer began seeing Dr. Paul
Killian at Arthritis and Rheumatic Disease Associates, who prescribed prednisone and
Plaquenil to control her arthritis.
In January 2001, Palmer’s arthritis flared as a result of her recent gallbladder
removal and then subsided. Within a few months thereafter, Dr. Killian added Celebrex,
methotrexate, and folic acid to Palmer’s medication regimen. During that time, Dr.
Killian noted that Palmer’s condition was “much improved.” At a visit in August 2001,
Dr. Killian noted that her rheumatoid arthritis was “finally coming under excellent
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control.” Palmer was working full-time at this point. A few months later, in November
2001, she was laid off due to company downsizing.
Between 2001 and 2004, Palmer continued under the care of her rheumatologist.
Her medical records show that despite occasional flare-ups of arthritis and “bad
prognostic factors,” she continued to respond well to medications. Dr. Killian told her
that disability insurance benefits would be appropriate for her, because her rheumatoid
arthritis was a chronic condition that would probably require lifelong medications.
Palmer switched doctors because of a change in her insurance. Her new
rheumatologist, Dr. Elliott Goldberg, wrote to Palmer’s primary care physician in March
2004 that she was stable on medications and that her rheumatoid arthritis was “nearly in
complete remission.” Writing again on July 29, 2004, Dr. Goldberg stated: “She has been
completely stable without any symptoms whatsoever . . . . My impression is that her
disease is in remission . . . . She is much better since she has stopped her work.”
Palmer applied for disability insurance benefits in December 2001. The
Pennsylvania Bureau of Disability Determination, acting on behalf of the Commissioner
of Social Security, denied her claim in March 2002. Palmer requested a hearing before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). At the hearing in November 2002, Palmer testified
that she could perform a variety of activities of daily living, including: doing household
chores at her own pace, shopping, exercising on a bicycle or walking, and manipulating
objects while cooking. She stated that she could usually perform fine motor tasks such as
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tying shoes and fastening buttons. She denied having difficulty sitting and said she could
lift and carry a gallon of milk.
In December 2002, the ALJ determined that Palmer was not disabled. Palmer
requested review by the Social Security Administration Appeals Council. The Appeals
Council denied the request for review in September 2003.
Palmer appealed to the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania. The Court vacated the decision in May 2004 and remanded the case,
determining that the ALJ improperly failed to consider medical evidence and to develop
the factual record.
After a second hearing, the ALJ issued a decision in November 2004 granting
benefits for a closed period. The ALJ determined that Palmer was disabled from
November 9, 2001 (her alleged date of onset) until July 29, 2004 (the date Dr. Goldberg
wrote that she was “completely stable without any symptoms whatsoever”).
Palmer filed exceptions, arguing that benefits should be awarded on an ongoing
basis. In August 2006, the Appeals Council denied Palmer’s request for review. Palmer
appealed to the District Court, which affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Palmer now appeals to
this Court.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. When a social security
claimant appeals the decision of the Commissioner, our role “is identical to that of the
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District Court, namely to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the
Commissioner’s decision.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d
Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate. Id.
III.
Palmer argues that the ALJ failed to consider all of the relevant medical evidence.
We disagree. The ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, and the District
Court did not err when it affirmed the ALJ’s decision.
We have explained the nature of the inquiry in Social Security disability cases:
In order to establish a disability under the Social Security Act, a claimant
must demonstrate there is some “medically determinable basis for an
impairment that prevents him from engaging in any ‘substantial gainful
activity’ for a statutory twelve-month period.” Stunkard v. Secretary of
Health and Human Services, 841 F.2d 57, 59 (3d Cir.1988); 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1). A claimant is considered unable to engage in any substantial
activity “only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of
such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot
. . . engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
Id. at 427-428. The ALJ must determine whether there has been any medical
improvement related to a claimant’s ability to work, and if the improvement would cease
if the claimant were to go back to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(c)(3)(iv).
Here, the ALJ made his determination based on Palmer’s treatment notes and her
testimony about her daily physical activity. The ALJ found that she could not continue to
perform her former job manipulating tiny objects under a microscope on a production
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line. He concluded, however, that her condition had subsided such that she was capable
of doing sedentary work that did not require her to engage in gross or fine manipulation
more than occasionally. The ALJ endorsed the Vocational Expert’s recommendations for
available jobs, including building receptionist, cashier, hand packer, and gate person.
Palmer contends that the ALJ erred when giving weight to the written statements
by Dr. Goldberg. She claims that starting to work again would only cause her condition
to destabilize. She points to the last sentence of Dr. Goldberg’s July 29, 2004 letter,
which says: “[Palmer] is much better since she has stopped her work.”
There is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s disagreement with Palmer’s
interpretation of Dr. Goldberg’s letter. The letter does not clearly state that there was a
causal link between Palmer’s stability on her medications and the fact that she was not
working. Palmer’s former doctor, Dr. Killian, observed that she responded positively to
medications even while she was still working. The evidence on record shows continuing
improvement in her rheumatoid arthritis between 2001 and 2004 and an ability to function
in her activities of daily living. Palmer testified at her hearing that she was able to
perform a wide variety of physical activities, even though some activities had to be
performed at a pace that accommodated her arthritis. Therefore, we conclude that
substantial evidence supports the determination that Palmer can “engage in . . . substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
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Palmer believes that the decision of the ALJ conflicts with 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1594(c)(iv), which states that temporary remissions are not a sufficient basis upon
which to base a medical improvement. We conclude that the rulings of the ALJ and
District Court do not conflict with the regulation. Dr. Killian’s notes state that disability
insurance benefits would be appropriate for Palmer; on more than one occasion, he
recommended that she apply (or re-apply). However, Dr. Goldberg’s July 29, 2004 letter
indicates that Palmer was stable on her medications and that her rheumatoid arthritis was
in complete remission.
“When a conflict in the evidence exists, the ALJ may choose whom to credit but
cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429
(citation omitted). Here, the ALJ did not reject Dr. Killian’s conclusions “for no reason
or for the wrong reason.” Instead, he reviewed all the medical evidence and determined
that Palmer’s medical condition had improved sufficiently to allow her to participate in
substantial gainful activity. Moreover, he took Palmer’s rheumatoid arthritis into
account, listing sedentary jobs that Palmer could perform without aggravating her
condition. We conclude that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that
Palmer was eligible for benefits during a closed period and not on an ongoing basis.
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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